Micronesian Island Forum or Second Island Chain Alliance?

These Islands By Robert Underwood

Pacific island nations and territories like to discuss the Blue Continent and give dramatic visions about a Pacific future based on island wisdom, traditions and connections. Despite the diversity of island forms, cultural differences and colonial histories, all Pacific Islanders feel very special about their island homes.

Many promote Pacific Islander unity everywhere, especially in countries like New Zealand and the United States. Nesian Kulture offers island gear and T-shirts that promote “Nesian” pride, with the historic divisions being deliberately underplayed.

Several Pacific island thinkers, especially the younger generation, decry the regional divisions into Micronesia, Polynesia and Melanesia as a sort of colonial imposition. Dumont d’Urville’s contribution to cartography has fallen on hard times in the minds of many intellectuals and activists. Yet, other than “Nesia” and the Blue Continent rhetoric, these geographic terms have remained strong and meaningful.

The terms become the reference points for subregional organizations in the island Pacific.

While it may be the smallest region, Micronesia has two subregional groups: the Micronesian Presidents Summit, which includes only independent nations led by presidents; and the Micronesian Islands Forum, which includes governors from Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands and the four states of the Federated States of Micronesia.

Elsewhere in the region, we also have the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) and the Polynesian Leaders Group (PLG), which include different combinations.

Not all groups have existing secretariats.

The MSG includes Indonesia as an associate member, with East Timor and West Papua as observers. There is a mix of independent countries and areas seeking full independence. Presumably, Bougainville’s full independence is likely to add yet another member to the MSG.

Extending beyond both territories and independent nations, the PLG encompasses Hawaii and New Zealand as homelands of Polynesian peoples. The PLG is the largest in terms of geography, as it parallels the Polynesian Triangle.

In 2007, MSG had China build a headquarters in Vanuatu. Perhaps the United States or New Zealand will establish a headquarters for the PLG Secretariat.

The Micronesians have avoided the challenge of explaining the unity of differing political entities by subdividing into two groups—though it’s unclear if this was intentional.

The region’s two subregional organizations appear to be an effort to distinguish independent nations from territories.

But you need to put the territories somewhere. You can’t really have a Micronesian regional group without Guam and the Northern Marianas. In almost all meetings in Micronesia, most leaders go through Guam somewhere along the line.

Guam effectively functions as the “metropole” for Micronesia. While Guam has the most heft in economic and institutional size and complexity, it lacks the authority over its own affairs that the freely associated states and independent nations enjoy.

It can even be argued that the Northern Marianas has more internal control than Guam. Although it has a strong presence in regional matters, Guam is the weak sister on the international stage,

Micronesians generally feel left behind or ignored. The “passing over” of potential Micronesian leadership at the Pacific Island Forum nearly prompted the subregion’s withdrawal from the organization in 2021.

While Islanders north of the equator resent the lack of attention paid to their areas, the use of "South Pacific" as a generic term for the entire Pacific rankles many.

Young Micronesians have launched a clothing line called “Brdfrtco,” featuring breadfruit logos, and the slogan “North Pacific Tribe” emblazoned on their T-shirt product. Perhaps Micronesians will prefer breadfruit over Nesian clothing lines.

The regional groups, except for Melanesia, usually avoid weighty political or international issues. MSG welcomes independence movements from fellow Melanesians. The PLG supports decolonization, despite having the United States, through Hawaii, and New Zealand as members.

Micronesian governments are not likely to take a strong stand in support of Guam’s desire to change its political status. Most governments focus on dealing with poor airline service, upgrading telecommunication systems, climate change and environment degradation, especially if outside powers cause it.

All of this is largely a Pacific island debate that occurs among leaders when they gather to discuss regional issues and unity.

There is the power and pride of soaring rhetoric, accompanied by navigational metaphors, traditional dancing and young faces eagerly looking to the future. In reality, external powers divide the region differently. They view it through a distinct lens — one that may eventually put an end to d’Urville’s cartography.

We have the militarized, strategic view of the island that subsumes all concerns about fisheries, climate change and ecological survival into very simple categories. In the North Pacific Tribe, we are very accustomed to this conversation. It has put our beliefs about ourselves out of focus and redirected our concerns about the future to strategic military competition.

These island groupings are labelled the first, second, and third island chains. It is almost entirely based on potential conflict with China and how to prepare for it. Interestingly, this concept reached its maturation during the Cold War, but some elements of it began during World War II in the Allied war against Japan.

Today, it is entirely focused on conflict with China. The first island chain is the likely area of conflict and includes Taiwan, Okinawa, areas around the South China Sea and some of the Philippines. The second island chain now becomes the critical area because it is both the line of defense and the potential line of offense.

Most of Micronesia is in the second island chain. Hence, the massive U.S. military investments in Guam, the CNMI, Palau and the FSM. The Marshall Islands’ role has long been defined.

The third island chain wraps around from the Aleutians, through Hawaii, much of Polynesia and runs toward New Zealand. The Polynesians appear to be in a safer zone, while Micronesia holds strategic significance.

The MIF could, and perhaps would, get more attention if it started calling itself the Second Island Chain Alliance. I don’t think the PLG enhances its status by claiming to be the Third Island Chain Group. Parts of Melanesia fit into the first and second island chains. They really are a Spearhead of sorts.

I am starting to feel better about d’Urville’s labels already.

   The problem is that this militarized view of the islands has blurred the islanders’ perception of their homelands. I don’t know any Islanders who grew up with family stories about whether we are in the second, first or third island chain.

We heard stories about distant ancestors who accomplished incredible feats that defied natural laws, as well as stories about grandparents and great-grandparents who demonstrated resilience, intelligence and pride in the face of challenges, whether within the village, across the island or from external forces.

Dr. Robert Underwood is the former president of the University of Guam and a former member of the U.S. House of Representatives. Send feedback to anacletus2010@gmail.com.

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