Small island, big crossroads: What China’s Pacific playbook really means for Guam

Frontline Pacific By Chirag M. Bhojwani

The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission’s latest report makes one thing impossible to ignore. Guam and its neighbors are now central terrain in a widening contest between the United States and China.

This is not a distant fight. It is happening across our region, and it is already shaping the conditions of daily life on Guam.

The report’s fifth chapter, “Small Islands, Big Stakes,” lays out how Beijing has spent years building influence across the Pacific islands. It shows that China’s approach is not improvised. It is deliberate, coordinated and patient.

And while the case studies focus on places like Palau, the Solomon Islands and Kiribati, the implications land straight on our shores. The report calls Guam the “gas station, repair shop and command center” for U.S. forces in any conflict with China. If that is true, then everything happening around the second island chain should concern us.

Strategists often talk about two island chains that control power projection in the Western Pacific. The first runs through Japan, Taiwan and the Philippines. The second runs through the Northern Marianas, Guam, Palau and the Federated States of Micronesia.

Most people on Guam hear that and think of World War II. Beijing hears it and thinks about the future. Chinese strategists have studied those battles to answer a simple question. How could a rival stop the United States from using these islands again?

Their answer is not only missiles. It is influence. It is pressure. It is shaping the politics and economies of small island governments, tilting them away from the United States or leaving them too dependent on China to resist.

China’s playbook in the region has three main parts. First, build economic reliance. For many Pacific island countries, China has become the top trade partner. That leverage can turn into punishment and Palau knows this all too well. When it refused to switch recognition from Taiwan to Beijing, the Chinese government cut off tour groups, dealing a heavy blow to a tourism-dependent economy.

Second, dominate the information environment. Beijing funds local media, sponsors travel for officials and journalists, and spreads narratives that cast the United States as unreliable or self-interested.

In the Solomon Islands, after the switch from Taipei to Beijing, Chinese messaging pushed the idea that the U.S. and Taiwan were behind unrest. Local outlets repeated these claims even as officials privately complained about bribery tied to Chinese actors.

Third, deepen police and security ties. Most Pacific island nations do not have militaries. Beijing has zeroed in on that. Its security pact with the Solomon Islands allows Chinese police and “other relevant forces” to deploy in ways that protect Chinese projects and friendly leaders. These deals also give Chinese vessels legal openings to use local ports. That blurs the line between commercial presence and strategic access.

Layered onto this is a wave of Chinese-backed infrastructure: ports, airfields, telecom systems and undersea cables. Many projects are pitched as development help. But in a crisis, they could offer Beijing staging options or data advantages.

For Guam, the danger is not theoretical. Palau, our close Micronesian neighbor, has already faced major cyberattacks after reinforcing its ties with the United States and Taiwan. Chinese-linked buyers have tried to acquire land near sensitive sites there. The aim seems clear: delay or derail U.S. projects.

Chinese research vessels, many tied to the People’s Liberation Army, have mapped waters around Taiwan, Guam and Palau. The data they gather helps with submarine operations and with plans to disrupt communications in wartime. Undersea cables are an even bigger concern as about 95 percent of global data travels through these lines.

Guam sits at a critical junction connecting the U.S. to Asia. Control over the companies that lay, repair and inspect those cables is a growing battleground. Even when Chinese firms lose major bids, they push for roles in maintenance. Once they gain access to the tools and vessels involved, they may not need to own the cable to exploit it.

All of this puts Guam on the front line of a fight that will shape the region’s future. Yet our voice in Washington’s decisions remains limited, and at times it feels nonexistent.

China understands that gap. It is using it. Across the Pacific, Beijing repeats a simple message: “We show up. We do not talk down to you. We deliver.” For island communities stretched thin by climate change, infrastructure needs and scarce public funds, that message can hit close to home.

If the United States mishandles this moment, Guam and our Micronesian neighbors could become pressure points China squeezes early in a crisis. The solution is not to panic. It is to demand smarter policy.

Guam should push for a real second island chain strategy that treats Guam, the CNMI and the freely associated states as a connected strategic community that receives steady, predictable investment.

We need stronger defenses against disinformation and opaque foreign money. We need hardened and diversified infrastructure, from cable routes to fuel storage to ports. Guam should take a larger diplomatic role. We sit between America and Asia, and that position gives us the ability to convene, connect and shape regional conversations.

We cannot change our geography. But we can change how it is used and who gets to decide. Guam should not accept being a passive square on someone else’s game board. The competition is here. The question now is whether we let others define our future or take ownership of it while we still can.

Chirag M. Bhojwani is the director of Regional Center for Public Policy at the University of Guam. Send feedback to strategy@bluecontinent.solutions

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