US security strategy emphasizes America First: How does Micronesia fit in?
- Admin
- 17 hours ago
- 5 min read
The much-awaited Trump National Security Strategy is out and we wonder what it means for us in the island Pacific and what it portends for the rest of the world.
For years, we have heard the phrases “free and open Indo-Pacific” and “rules-based order” when discussing our part of the world. The "free and open" is still there, but the rules-based order is gone. Following the rules is no longer a priority.
This is in keeping with the overall tone of the NSS, which emphasizes protecting American greatness (America First) as an international strategy, without explaining why it is a great nation. It primarily references its muscular military prominence and protection of an economy supported by protective tariffs and robust promotion of an American industrial base. American greatness is defined not by its values or democratic example to the rest of the world.
Of course, we will find words that speak to cultural strength, civil rights, the American worker and even “soft power.” In this regard, the document reads as if it were written by several individuals who wanted to include a few words emphasizing “America First” as defined by military chest-thumping. It sounds curated to make it appear that the success of Trump's capitalist friends is consistent with core commitments to certain principles.
It states that American policy will be guided by respect for national borders and a “predisposition to non-interference,” which does not seem to apply in the Western hemisphere. Venezuelan boats and ships are under regular attack by the powerful U.S. Navy and Coast Guard. Many of these actions are borderline war crimes. I guess “rule-based order” is not applicable either. This must be part of the Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine.
When it comes to strategic vision, the Trump plan calls for “flexible realism.” This can mean anything. America will be realistic when it needs to be, but it will avoid rules or ideals at its discretion. The Trump administration's flexibility policy seeks to build relations with other nations, without imposing “democratic or other social change that differs widely from their own traditions and history.”
Non-interference in Venezuela may result in regime change. But would-be dictators in Venezuela can take heart and argue that continuing authoritarian rule is part of the country’s history and traditions. We won’t know what direction this flexibility will take until Trump himself decides.
The document is a jumble of ideas, sometimes contradictory, designed to empower a single individual. As such, it doesn’t even articulate a general course direction as much as it can be used to justify any future activity decided by the commander-in-chief.
It is a document that breaks from traditional American approaches to world leadership since the end of World War II. More significantly, it is a value-free document and focuses on building up the American economy as the primary reason for foreign engagement. In that sense, it is both remarkably self-serving and revealing. The engagement with other countries is not really based on shared values but on profitable transactions.
ADVERTISEMENT
This is reflected in the Indo-Pacific portion of the NSS. Under the title “Asia,” our part of the world is clearly second in importance to the Western Hemisphere. Sorry, we are in the wrong hemisphere for primary American interests, including the protection of the U.S. homeland.
The defense of Taiwan against China's forcible integration is framed in terms of its economic importance, especially its semiconductor manufacturing. While still acknowledging the one-China policy, the NSS doesn't mention defending a democracy or serving as a buttress against totalitarian forms of government. It hints that control of Taiwan provides access to the Second Island Chain.
There is a discussion of strengthening the first island chain, which hints at greater burden-sharing by Japan and South Korea. The U.S. commits to working with those countries, but only if they hold up a greater share of the military counterweight to China. The details of how this would be implemented, with respect to basing and the use of American forces, could be outlined in a forthcoming National Defense Strategy.
The activities closer to home in the Second Island Chain were mentioned only in reference to Taiwan. There is no reference to any Pacific island, no discussion of rule-based order and no mention of North Korea as a threat or consideration.
North Korea’s nuclear capability and capacity to hit the U.S. homeland (depending on whether Guam is included in that definition) may be the greatest disruptive force in the area.
In combination with the emphasis on burden-sharing by Japan and South Korea, the impetus for those countries to acquire nuclear weapons gets stronger by the day.
The Pacific islands are not really in the discussion at that rarified level. The freely associated states and the two U.S. territories, Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands, are trying to understand how they fit in and what they should do.
Of course, Palau, the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia—affiliated with the U.S. under separate Compacts of Free Association—can say “no” up to a point, but the U.S. territories can only say “slow down.” That is the reality. But they still need to engage and represent their own interests.
To date, regional and local leadership appear to be rudderless and entirely dependent upon responding to U.S initiatives. The islands are just receiving plans rather than making them, responding and making do, trying to make lemonade out of lemons, perfuming odious realities and touting moderate investment as major economic initiatives.
Most analysts point out that the Asia-Pacific region is playing second fiddle, while some of our leaders think we are the first violin.
The U.S. encourages each COFA nation to develop its own security plans, offering them additional U.S. funding and support for associated costs. For the CNMI and Guam, there are homeland security officers and advisers to the respective governors on military and security matters. All of these activities are coordinated with, through or by military uniforms atop Nimitz Hill, where the Joint Region Marianas and the Joint Task Force Micronesia sit.
The acronyms JRM and JTF should be as significant as OMG, WTF, FOMO and NSFW in our daily policy discussions.
JRM and JTF are active, well-funded and staffed with professionals, some of whom are islanders who have been reassigned to the region.
A New Year awaits all of us. This is not over. We still await the unveiling of the National Defense Strategy and Nuclear Policy Review, which typically accompany the NSS. It is doubtful that they will be any different from what has already been presented. It is also unlikely that they will offer any coherence to the existing policy. But they will come out in 2026.
Happy New Year, Micronesia!
Dr. Robert Underwood is the former president of the University of Guam and former member of the U.S. House of Representatives. Send feedback to anacletus2010@gmail.com.
Subscribe to
our monthly
digital edition