Trump’s Greenland play: Is free association an option?

By Howard Hills

 A recent Wall Street Journal report echoed the curiosity among experts and diplomats on whether a U.S. deal on Greenland could be modeled on three successful U.S. free association pacts with strategically located Pacific island nations. The United States’ mutual security alliance with Palau, the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia provides far more binding defense powers and commitments than the NATO treaty. 

Contrary to some low-information commentaries arguing that all U.S. security interests can be secured through more conventional military cooperation, the free association political status model would give the U.S. full authority and responsibility for the control of Greenland’s security and defense in perpetuity.

That includes permanent “strategic denial” of access to Greenland’s land, sea, and airspace by armed forces of any nation without U.S. permission.

Duplicating the Compact of Free Association for vast strategically located Pacific island chains would require adaptation of that political status model to terms for sharing powers and responsibilities agreed by the United States, Denmark and the people of Greenland. The legal and legislative history of U.S. negotiation and ratification of the COFA treaties in 1986, 2003 and 2024 provide vitally important foundational building blocks of a possible Greenland free association deal.   

The COFA precedents for Pacific island nations with strategic value comparable to that of Greenland provide a template for a Greenland merger deal. Acceptance of the COFA model by Congress, federal courts and the United Nations demonstrates that the U.S. and Denmark, as metropolitan powers, could agree to become joint partners with the people of Greenland in a tripartite COFA. That could constitute a political, economic and strategic alliance in which each partner would have defined powers equivalent to sovereign ownership rights.  

As mutually agreed, the U.S. could secure sovereign strategic military control rights that can’t be terminated without U.S. consent and Denmark’s continued national interests in Greenland can be defined as well. The people of Greenland can be self-governing with rights and powers recognized under associated state status.  

The potential benefits for Greenlanders include reciprocal visa waivers, visa-free entry and residency in the U.S., where they would be recognized as legal non-immigrants who can work or pursue education. The associated status does not entail U.S. citizenship because free association is constitutionally distinct from full annexation, extending exclusive U.S. sovereignty over Greenland’s territory and population.

As a variation from the Pacific island COFA that is based on the right of independence, a viable tripartite COFA for Denmark, U.S. and the people of Greenland could recognize sovereign interests and rights of all three COFA partners. 

Just as COFA can be a better deal for Greenland than independent nationhood, free association also precludes a political status dilemma posed for former and current American island possessions under full single sovereign annexation as a U.S. territory.

Upon embracing a legal duty of allegiance to America, equal democratic and legal rights of U.S. citizenship come only with permanent incorporation into the federal union and admission to full statehood.  

If properly proposed and negotiated based on understanding meaningful differences from the Pacific islands COFA, a tripartite Greenland merger COFA is an option that could deliver military control the President wants most, without political status features that do not implicate vital American interests.    

Howard Hills served as senior legal advisor for COFA negotiations in the Executive Office of the President and State Department (1982-1988) and Senior Advisor, Office of the Secretary of the Interior, attached to special presidential envoy for COFA negotiations (2020-2023).

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