The price of being American: How the Jones Act punishes Guam for its loyalty

The Long Haul By Samuel S. Kim

Part 3 of a four-part series on the 2026 Guam elections.

A gallon of milk costs $12 on Guam. A container of household goods shipped from the U.S. East Coast costs twice as much to reach a U.S. territory in the Pacific as it does to reach a foreign island in the Caribbean. Guam families pay far more than they should for basic necessities—not because of geography alone, but because of a 105-year-old federal law that was never designed with Guam in mind.

That law is the Jones Act. Understanding it—what it was meant to do, why it is failing, and what Guam’s congressional delegate must do about it—is essential for every voter heading to the polls in 2026.

Officially known as the Merchant Marine Act of 1920, the Jones Act requires that any goods shipped between two U.S. ports must travel on vessels that are American-built, American-owned, American-flagged, and crewed by U.S. citizens.³ It applies to every state and territory connected by ocean routes — including Hawaii, Alaska, Puerto Rico, and Guam.

The law traces its roots even further back. The very first Congress of the United States in 1789 passed laws restricting domestic waterborne trade to American vessels. The 1920 Act was largely a restatement and strengthening of those principles under Sen. Wesley Jones of Washington.

The reasoning behind the Jones Act was straightforward and legitimate for its time. World War I had demonstrated that a nation without sufficient commercial shipping capacity is dangerously vulnerable. German U-boats had crippled Allied supply lines. When the U.S. entered the war, the government scrambled to build a fleet of cargo ships, and when the war ended, it was left holding hundreds of surplus vessels at enormous cost.

The Jones Act served two purposes simultaneously. First, it provided a mechanism to sell off the surplus fleet to American private operators. Second, it ensured the United States would never again be caught without a strong domestic merchant marine: keep commercial ships American-built and American-crewed, and in time of war, those ships and sailors are available to the military.

During World War II, U.S. merchant mariners moved 90 percent of combat cargo used by Allied forces, often sailing through active war zones.⁷ The Jones Act’s defenders point to this as evidence the law served its purpose.

The world of 1920 and the world of 2026 are not the same.

In 1980, approximately 257 vessels in U.S. waters were Jones Act-compliant. Today, that number has fallen to just 93 — representing roughly 1 percent of all oceangoing commercial vessels in the world.⁸ The law did not save the American merchant fleet. It presided over its slow decline.

The reason is economic. Building a ship in an American shipyard now costs roughly five times more than building an equivalent vessel overseas. Operating a U.S.-flagged vessel costs 2.7 times more than operating a foreign-flagged counterpart.¹⁰ No amount of protectionism can make those economics disappear — it can only transfer the pain from shipbuilders to consumers.

For states along the continental U.S., the impact is real but partially cushioned. Trucks and trains provide alternative routes. Shipping competition exists. For Guam, there is no cushion. Nearly everything residents eat, wear, drive, build with, and power their homes with arrives by ship. There is no truck route to the mainland. There is no alternative.

The irony is that even the law’s own goals have gone unmet. The Jones Act fleet is a shadow of what it was. Congress has waived the law repeatedly during hurricanes, oil emergencies, and other crises — acknowledging implicitly that the costs it imposes are so severe they must be suspended in times of hardship.¹¹ And yet for Guam, every day is a kind of hardship the law refuses to acknowledge.

The data on the Jones Act’s cost to Guam families is limited — and that gap is itself telling.

The only Guam-specific study on record was commissioned by the government of Guam in 1996. It found that island families were paying at least $1,139 per year in excess shipping costs. Nearly 30 years have passed and no equivalent study has been done since. The most careful recent work was the 2020 Grassroot Institute of Hawaii study, which found the Jones Act costs the average Hawaii family approximately $1,800 per year and Hawaii’s economy $1.2 billion annually, resulting in roughly 9,100 fewer jobs.

Hawaii and Guam face structurally similar shipping conditions—remote, island-dependent on ocean freight for virtually all necessities, served by a small number of Jones Act carriers. The directional finding is consistent: the law adds hundreds of dollars per family per year, falling hardest on those least able to absorb it.

That Guam has not received the same research attention as Hawaii is itself worth naming. The next delegate to Washington should be demanding a Guam-specific economic study with the same urgency they bring to legislative reform.

Meanwhile, goods from the U.S. West Coast do not even arrive directly. The only U.S.-flag carrier serving Guam routes cargo first through Japan before delivery to the island—adding distance and cost that consumers absorb.¹⁴

And the U.S. Virgin Islands—another American territory—is explicitly exempt from the Jones Act. Two American territories, two sets of rules.

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The United States is currently engaged in conversations about expanding its territorial footprint. The idea of Greenland becoming a U.S. territory has been discussed at the highest levels of government. There are strategic reasons the U.S. values Pacific and Arctic territories—forward positioning, natural resources, geopolitical reach.

But consider what any territory evaluating U.S. status would see when they look at Guam: an island taxed by a century-old shipping law that even nearby foreign islands are spared, watching talent leave, receiving no Guam-specific research into the economic damage being done.

If the United States wants its territories to be genuine partners and not geographic conveniences, it must treat them accordingly. The Jones Act, as applied to Guam, sends the opposite message.

Guam’s congressional delegate holds non-voting status in the House of Representatives. But the power to advocate, to build coalitions, and to introduce legislation is real and consequential. On this issue, the groundwork has already been laid.

Guam Del. James Moylan, alongside Rep. Ed Case of Hawaii, has introduced three legislative measures to address the Jones Act burden on noncontiguous communities.

The Noncontiguous Shipping Relief Act would fully exempt Guam and other noncontiguous territories from Jones Act requirements, allowing competitive international carriers to serve the island directly.

The Noncontiguous Shipping Reasonable Rate Act takes a more targeted approach: it would cap what domestic shippers can charge for noncontiguous routes at no more than 10 percent above comparable international shipping rates — ending the effective monopoly that currently allows carriers to charge whatever the law will bear.

The Noncontiguous Shipping Competition Act would eliminate Jones Act restrictions wherever shipping monopolies or duopolies have already formed — recognizing that the law’s supposed benefit of reliable service has, in practice, become a mechanism for price extraction.

A fourth measure, the Noncontiguous Energy Relief and Access Act, co-sponsored by Moylan, Case, and Congressman Ritchie Torres of New York, would exempt energy products from Jones Act restrictions for Guam, Hawaii, Alaska, and Puerto Rico, targeting one of the most direct cost drivers on the island.¹

These bills exist. What they need is momentum — and a delegate who treats building that momentum as the defining work of their term.

Questions Every Voter Should Ask

For the congressional delegate — the only office with the standing to move these bills:

Which of the four Jones Act reform bills do you actively support, and what is your specific legislative strategy to advance each through committee?

Have you secured co-sponsors beyond Hawaii? Which mainland representatives have you engaged, and what is their position?

What is your position on commissioning a rigorous, Guam-specific economic study of the Jones Act’s cost to island families?

Will you seek a Jones Act waiver specifically for Guam’s essential food and energy imports while broader reform is pursued?

The delegation that represents Guam in Washington carries a responsibility that goes beyond symbolic advocacy. In 1951, a government commission recommended exempting Guam from U.S. shipping laws entirely. In 1979, a United Nations report called for the law’s repeal or amendment as it applies to Guam.

Seventy-four years have passed since the first formal recommendation for relief. Guam’s loyalty to the United States is not in question. The question is whether that loyalty is being honored in return.

Samuel S. Kim is a tech executive and engineering leader with more than 20 years of experience. He founded and scaled a 60-person R&D division in Seoul and holds a degree in Economics from UCLA. He writes as a concerned resident and registered voter of Guam. He can be contacted at sk102.co.

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