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Trump’s deal-making comes to the Pacific: COFA facing the risk of being reduced to a bargaining chip

  • Writer: Admin
    Admin
  • 9 minutes ago
  • 4 min read
Inside the Reef By Joyce McClure
Inside the Reef By Joyce McClure

 Donald Trump has spent decades showing how he treats agreements.


In New York, contractors and small businesses did the work—and then waited. Payments were delayed, reduced or tied up in legal fights many couldn’t afford to continue. For Trump, contracts weren’t fixed obligations. They were leverage.


That wasn’t a one-off. It was how he did business.


I saw a version of this myself. In the 1980s, when Trump Tower was new, I was a public relations executive managing an account that represented the building’s struggling retail tenants. Tourists packed the atrium to gawk at the waterfall, gold and marble, but they weren’t buying. The merchants were hurting. Even then, the gap between the image Trump projected and the reality others were dealing with was impossible to miss.


And yet, many of his supporters still point to his so-called “business acumen” as a reason to trust him.


They’re wrong—and the record proves it.


For Trump, agreements only matter when they work in his favor.


That approach may have worked in private business. But what happens when it’s applied not only to the Constitution but to international agreements—especially in one of the most strategically contested regions in the world?


That question matters in the Pacific, where U.S. relationships rest on long-term commitments like the Compact of Free Association with the Federated States of Micronesia, the Marshall Islands and Palau.


These agreements are not symbolic. They are the backbone of U.S. strategic presence in a vast and contested region. In exchange for military access, the United States provides economic support and essential services. Citizens from these nations live and work in places like Guam, Hawaii, Oregon and Texas, strengthening ties that are both practical and personal.


Legally, a president cannot unilaterally cancel COFA. These are mutual agreements, approved by Congress, with funding commitments that extend for decades. But those guardrails depend on a willingness to respect them—and recent experience with the current administration has shown how readily they can be tested, stretched and challenged.


Even without canceling an agreement, it can still be weakened.


Funding commitments, even when approved, are not immune to pressure. COFA provides billions of dollars in long-term support—funding that could quickly become a bargaining chip in broader budget fights, especially as military demands grow. A president who treats agreements as leverage may see those commitments not as obligations, but as resources to be renegotiated.


Agreements can be delayed. They can be questioned. They can be used as leverage in unrelated political fights.


Even the perception that the United States is backing away, even temporarily, can have immediate consequences. Because in the Pacific, influence doesn’t sit still.


For nearly four decades, China has worked patiently and persistently to expand its influence across the region. That effort hasn’t been abstract. It has included infrastructure deals, political pressure, economic incentives and, in some cases, successful attempts to weaken U.S. relationships. The goal is straightforward: reduce American presence and replace it with Beijing’s own.


One recent example made that strategy unmistakably clear. In 2022, China signed a security agreement with the Solomon Islands, raising alarms across the region and in Washington. The deal opened the door to a potential Chinese security presence less than 1,200 miles from Australia, demonstrating how quickly influence can shift when opportunities arise.


If Washington signals uncertainty, Beijing is ready to move, offering funding, infrastructure and political support to governments that can’t afford instability. It has done so before. In some cases, it has succeeded.


We’re seeing a version of this pattern play out in real time in Trump’s handling of the war with Iran. After launching the military action without the approval of Congress, he has shifted rapidly, often within hours, between threats of escalation, calls for negotiation and announcements of success that are denied by Iranian leaders, producing a ceasefire that remains fragile and uncertain. Negotiations have been led in part by largely inexperienced political allies, former business associates and even a family member with deep financial ties to the region, rather than seasoned diplomats, raising serious concerns about credibility and effectiveness. U.S. allies have refused to get involved.


That kind of on-again, off-again approach may be a tactic. But it sends a different message: Trump’s agreements are conditional, unstable and subject to change.


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In the Pacific, that perception carries real consequences.


There’s another risk that gets less attention: inattention. The Pacific isn’t a region that rewards improvisation or casual engagement. These relationships require sustained focus and a clear understanding of what’s at stake. When that focus isn’t there and when the region simply isn’t a priority, commitments can drift. In a place as strategically sensitive as the Pacific, drift is all it takes to create an opening.


If COFA is treated the way Trump has historically treated contracts—as negotiable, delayable or expendable when convenient—it risks creating exactly the kind of opening China has been working toward for decades.


Once that space is given up, it is far harder to reclaim.


The issue isn’t whether COFA can be formally canceled. It’s whether it can be weakened enough to shake confidence in the United States as a reliable partner.


In the Pacific, that distinction matters. Because credibility is not just a diplomatic asset. It is the foundation of U.S. presence in the region.


And once that credibility slips, it won’t be Washington that fills the gap.


Joyce McClure is a former senior marketing executive and former Peace Corps volunteer in Yap. Transitioning to freelance writing, she moved to Guam in 2021 and relocated back to the mainland in 2023. Send feedback to joycemcc62@yahoo.com 


 

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