Pacific Islands Forum’s exclusion of great powers and its consequences
- Admin
- Oct 7
- 4 min read
In the prelude to the September 2025 Pacific Islands Forum summit in the Solomon Islands, Prime Minister Jeremiah Manele engendered much controversy over his initial denial of Taiwan's participation as one of the PIF dialogue partners.
This quickly merged into a denial of all 21 partners, notably the superpowers of the United States and China. While accusations were made about Chinese interference aimed at keeping Taiwan out, Manele attempted to turn the effort into a regional strategy to keep geostrategic competition at bay, hence addressing issues without interference.
Manele told his fellow Pacific nation leaders, “The world around us is changing fast. Competition among powerful interests is intensifying, and the Pacific must never be seen as an arena for others. We are not passive bystanders; we are nations, bound by shared values and the Pacific way.” This was presented as a pitch for intense intra-regional collaboration and solidarity. For the 2025 summit, the typical Pacific friend-to-all approach was scrapped for building friendship among ourselves.
It will be debated whether Manele’s decisions were part of a grand strategy or just an adroit move to deal with controversy and threats of non-participation by some Pacific nations regarding Taiwan’s non-participation.
The initial conventional wisdom is that keeping Taiwan out hurts Taiwan the most. Taiwan is now recognized by only three Pacific countries, and the future of Taiwan’s capacity to operate as an independent nation continues to diminish. In reality, making Taiwan an issue may have helped Taiwan’s Pacific presence.
Palau President Surangel Whipps Jr. has clearly stated his support for a robust Taiwan presence at the next Forum summit in Koror. Moreover, the Forum took great pains to include Taiwan at that summit, as the PIF partners' talks were deferred to 2026. This was done under the suddenly convenient logic that outstanding “intra-regional” issues were being addressed this year.
Between deferring the Forum talks, keeping the great powers at bay or responding to backdoor Chinese pressure, Taiwan’s role in Pacific island development issues may have grown a little. The Taiwan “lobby,” consisting of Palau, the Marshall Islands, Tuvalu and, indirectly, a few other voices, could claim a minor victory.
The challenge for Whipps next year is managing partner nation participation and not just the PIF members. Everyone will be present, exerting influence, applying pressure and offering Pacific island nations a wide array of deals.
Since China will be present and Whipps has already stated that Palau is at war with China, there is the opportunity for dramatic incidents, complete with intense maneuvering.
Into that mix is the construction of an American landing strip and radar station. The U.S. government has also requested that Palau host international asylum seekers trying to enter the U.S. Presumably, some could be Chinese.
In addition to assessing which Pacific island nation and leader may have benefited from this controversy over the region’s dialogue partners, we must examine the great power competitors themselves.
Did China overplay its insistence on keeping longtime benefactor of Pacific nations out of international meetings? In this regard, China may have lost a little prestige as so much effort is devoted to denying Taiwan a place for a few rewards. But China remains consistent in its diplomatic positioning.
In the run-up to the 2026 PIF, both China and Taiwan will likely employ more generous assistance schemes for Pacific nations.
The U.S. proceeded with its own plan. It hosted a kind of alternate PIF meeting in Papua New Guinea under the title "Reinvigorating the U.S. Pacific Partnership." That effort netted a few heads of state and some Pacific island nation participation, but most meetings were bilateral.
Led by Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau, the Americans discussed completing the Central Pacific Connect, dual-use infrastructure (meaning military and civilian) and strengthening disaster response through the U.S. Indo-Pacom’s Center for Excellence in Disaster Management. They also announced a planned Pacific Youth Congress and the continuation of the Peace Corps.
These “soft power” efforts appeared to be an effort to recoup significant lost standing among Pacific island nations.
The closure of the USAID office in Fiji, the imposition of tariffs and threatening travel bans have given the U.S. a stern rather than friendly face in recent months. Moreover, the American withdrawal from the Paris Climate Accord has put the Americans on the wrong side of the one issue that unites the entire island Pacific—climate change.
The Trump administration claims credit for initiating significant attention to the Pacific islands during his first term. The Biden administration amplified that effort and offered mostly soft power initiatives, including increasing USAID spending.
In Trump’s second term, the economic benefits of deep-sea mining are being touted and encouraged without addressing the objections of most Pacific island nations. Economic motivations and access to minerals appear to be of greater value than working with the consensus Pacific position.
Another potential impediment to invigorating the U.S. Pacific partnership is the review by the Trump administration of U.S. participation in international organizations. With the Trump administration's aversion to international organizations, the U.S. can withdraw from the Pacific Community and the South Pacific Regional Environment Programme. All the reinvigoration will occur through deep-sea mining, a few projects, support for tuna fishing and dual-use projects with individual nations rather than the collective that the Forum provides.
Of course, China also pursues individual relationships. It has already signed an agreement with the Cook Islands on seabed mining and is reportedly doing the same with Kiribati. In this environment, it would be taxing for any group of Pacific island nations to attempt to escape the dilemmas and consequences forced on them by great power competition. The Ocean of Peace, which was solemnly proclaimed at the PIF, stands as the best hope for the island Pacific— hope that remains unrealized.
Dr. Robert Underwood is the former president of the University of Guam and former member of the U.S. House of Representatives. Send feedback to anacletus2010@gmail.com.
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